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COMES NOW, Respondent Triad Leasing and Financial, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as 
"Triad"), by and through its attorneys of record, Ringert Law Chartered, and submits this 
Respondent's Brief in the above-titled matter. 
A. 
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE. 
This appeal involves the breach of a lease agreement between Triad, the lessor, and the 
Appellants, the lessees. The equipment lease agreement, involving a forklift, bucket and jib, was 
breached shortly after the agreement was funded because the deposit check was returned for 
insufficient funds and because the required insurance on the equipment was also cancelled because 
of a check returned for insufficient funds. Appellants have made a number of unsupported 
assertions that the deposit check was not to be negotiated, that all of the equipment had not been 
delivered and that the vendor, Lund Machinery, committed fraud. However, following a two day 
court trial before the district court, the Honorable Kathryn A. Sticklen presiding, the district court 
rejected Appellants defenses and entered judgment in favor of Triad. 
The Appellants attempted to blame their default of the lease agreement on the vendor, Lund 
Machinery, and brought a third party action against Lund Machinery. However, prior to the trial, 
the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Lund Machinery. Appellants filed a number 
of post-trial motions, including a motion for reconsideration of the summary judgment decision and 
a motion for a mistrial, which were all rejected by the district court. In addition, the district court 
awarded attorney fees and costs to both Triad and Lund Machinery. Appellants now appeal these 
judgments. 
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"'' 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION. 
Appellants did not provide a course of proceedings section in their opening brief and 
therefore Triad submits this course of proceedings section. On August 8, 2006, Triad filed a 
Verified Complaint alleging that the Appellants were in breach of an equipment lease agreement 
involving a forklift, bucket and jib. (R. pg. 9). Appellants subsequently filed an Answer, 
Counterclaim and Cross-claim alleging that Triad and the vendor for the equipment, Lund 
Machinery, committed breach of the lease agreement, fraud and violated the Idaho Consumer 
Protection Act. (R. pg. 20). Appellants later filed an Amended Answer, Counterclaim and Third 
Party Claim for the purpose of clarifying that Appellants' claim against Lund Machinery was a Third 
Party Claim and not a Cross-claim. (R. pg. 52). The Third Party Claim against Lund Machinery also 
alleged breach of contract, fraud and violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. 
Lund Machinery subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment requesting that the Third 
Party Claim by Appellants be dismissed. On November 7, 2007, the district court granted Lund 
Machinery's motion for summary judgment and issued a Memorandum Decision and Order. (R. pg. 
74). The Memorandum Decision and Order dismissed all claims by Appellants against Lund 
Machinery on the basis that Lund Machinery was not a party to the lease agreement, the alleged 
fraudulent statements were for promises of future events and there was no agency relationship 
between Ttiad and Lund Machinery. (R. pgs. 79-81 ). 
A two-day court ttial was held on November 26-27, 2007. Having already granted summary 
judgment in favor of Lund Machinery and dismissing all third party claims against Lund Machinery, 
neither Lund Machinery nor its counsel appeared at the trial. On February 14, 2008, the disttict 
court issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order which found that Appellants had 
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breached the lease agreement and awarded Triad $58,754.80 in damages. The district court also 
found that there was no evidence to support Appellants' counterclaim. (R. Pg. 92). Thereafter, the 
district court entered judgment in favor of Triad, and against the Appellants, on February 27, 2008 
in the amount of$72,334.40. (R. pg. 94). The district court later entered a supplemental judgment 
in favor of Triad for attorney fees and costs in the amount of$12,967.24. (R. pg. 102). 1 
The district court also entered judgment in favor of Lund Machinery based upon its prior 
summary judgment decision on March 31, 2008. (R. pg. 98). Appellants then filed a number of 
motions including a motion for reconsideration of the prior decision on Lund Machinery's motion 
for summary judgment, a motion for a mistrial, a motion to set aside the judgment entered in favor 
of Lund Machinery and an objection to Lund Machinery's request for costs and attorney fees. On 
July 30, 2008, the district court issued a Memorandum Decision and Order denying all of 
Appellants' motions (R. pg. I 04). The district court subsequently entered an amended judgment in 
favor of Lund Machinery, and against the Appellants, for attorney fees and costs in the amount of 
$17,131.82. (R. pg. 111). Appellants thereafter filed this appeal. 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
Triad disagrees with the majority of the statement of facts submitted by Appellants, and 
therefore, submits its own statement of facts. Furthermore, Triad would point the Court to the 
findings of fact by the district court which also summarize the facts and evidence presented to the 
district court during the two day court trial (See R. pg. 88-93). 
Triad and Appellants executed lease agreement for the lease of certain equipment for 
1 Appellants have not challenged the amount of the judgments or the award of attorney fees and 
costs to Triad. 
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business purposes. The lease agreement is with Rocky Mountain Rogues, Inc., however, both James 
Blittersdorf and his wife, Glenna Juline Blittersdorf Christofferson personally guaranteed the terms 
and conditions of the lease, including all payments due and owing to Triad. Appellants do not 
dispute that they all signed the lease agreement and Mr. and Mrs. Blittersdorfpersonally guaranteed 
the terms on March 15, 2006. (Tr. pg. 309, Ins. 5-21). Appellants do not disagree that they signed 
each of the documents, addendum, corporate resolution and personal property taxes included in the 
lease agreement package. (Exhibit A). Appellants accepted and signed lease agreement, along with 
a check in the amount of$5,600.00, was then returned to Triad. The check was not post dated and 
there was no indication on the check that the check was not to be negotiated. (Tr. pg. 313-15, Ins. 
15-22). On March 17, 2006, Vicki Turner, an employee of Triad, accepted and signed the lease 
agreement on behalf of Triad. (Tr. pg. 196, Ins. 15-20). 
The lease agreement provides that Triad's obligation to pay the vendor, Lund Machinery, for 
the equipment did not arise until an oral acceptance was taken. This provision of the lease agreement 
relates to Triad's obligation to pay Lund Machinery. Vicki Turner testified as to Triad's practice 
and policies of booking the lease agreement. Ms. Turner testified that once she receives the lease 
agreement back from lessee/ Appellants, she then goes through a documentation checklist (Exhibit 
E). (Tr. pg. 197-198, Ins. 10-10). She then goes through and verifies that the required information 
or documentation has been received. In this case, Ms. Turner verified, among other things, the 
equipment inspection, insurance verification and certificate and the deposit check had all been 
received. (Tr. pg. 198-200, Ins. 15-25). In addition, Ms. Turner verified the acknowledgment and 
acceptance of the equipment by the lessee. Id. Ms. Turner testified that it is Triad's practice to 
complete this checklist with every lease and that Triad would not release funds to the vendor until 
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all of the items on the checklist were completed. (Tr. pg. 205, Ins. 4-21). 
With regard to the acknowledgment and acceptance by the Appellants, Triad received a cover 
letter from the lease broker, Joe Leslie with FCI Financial, when Triad received the lease agreement 
and check from the Appellants. The cover letter (Exhibit G, page 3) stated that "When you are ready 
to do the telephone confirmation, call me and I will locate Mr. Blitterdorf." (Tr. pg. 102-103, Ins. 
24-10; pg. 201-202, Ins. 25-15). Ms. Turner testified that she received a phone call from Mr. 
Blittersdorf on March 20, 2006 sometime in the morning. Ms. Turner testified that the person 
identified themselves as Mr. Blittersdorf and she recalls the discussion because Mr. Blitterdorf 
mentioned his business and website. (Tr. pg. 203, Ins. 6-19). Ms. Turner also testified that Mr. 
Blittersdorf acknowledged and confirmed acceptance of the lease equipment and that it was 
acceptable to Triad to release the funds to Lund Machinery. (Tr. pg. 203-204, Ins. 6-21). Ms. Turner 
then contemporaneously signed the lease agreement and the delivery and acceptance on March 20, 
2006. 
On March 20, 2006, Triad released funds to the lease broker (Joe Leslie) for this lease 
agreement in the amount of $2,500.00 and to the vendor (Lund Machinery) in the amount of 
$56,465.68 (Exhibit I). (Tr. pg. 111, Ins. 1-23). The wire transfer to the vendor, Lund Machinery, 
was for the amount included on the invoice from Lund Machinery (Exhibit I, page 3). The invoice 
was for a forklift, bucket and jib. (Tr. pg. 111, Ins. 24-22). 
From the period of March 20 to March 30, 2006, there was no contact between Triad and 
Appellants. Appellants did not notify Triad that they believed that the equipment was not all 
delivered and did not notify Triad that they believed that the deposit check should not be negotiated. 
(Tr. pg. 108, Ins. 6-10). Triad did in fact negotiate the deposit check. On March 20, 2006, Ms. 
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Turner testified that she booked the lease agreement (Exhibit D) and the check from Appellants was 
negotiated. The check included the $5,000.00 deposit, $350.00 origination fee and $250.00 in sales 
tax. (Tr. pg. 100-101, Ins. 3-5). The check was returned for insufficient funds on March 23, 2006 
and again on March 29, 2006 (Exhibit C). (Tr. pg. 108-109, Ins. 11-25). Appellants do not dispute 
that the check was returned for insufficient funds and they made no attempt to cure the default. 
On April 11, 2006, Triad mailed a demand to the Appellants which notified them of the 
default (Exhibit F, page 2). Appellants do not dispute that they received the demand. The demand 
provided that Triad had exercised its right to accelerate the amount due according to paragraph 17(b) 
of the lease agreement. Appellants raised an issue of whether the default occurred on March 17, 
2006 or March 20, 2006, but the issue is moot because regardless there is no question that the check 
was returned for insufficient funds after both dates. 
Triad also attempted to give Appellants an opportunity to cure the default by sending a fax 
to Mr. Blittersdorf on March 31, 2006, informing him that Triad would need a cashier's check 
immediately (Exhibit L, last page). On April 21, 2006, Triad received notification that the insurance 
had been cancelled due to another NSF check. Appellants do not dispute that the lease agreement 
required them to maintain insurance and required Triad to be listed as an additional insured (Exhibit 
A, paragraph 12). Appellants also do not dispute that the insurance certificate that they provided to 
Triad had been cancelled due to another NSF check. Appellants contend that business insurance 
would cover the equipment. However, Appellants did not provide their business insurance coverage 
or any indication that the insurance listed the equipment and Triad as an additional insured as 
required by the lease agreement. (Tr. pg. 324-325; Ins. 5-21 ). Appellants also acknowledge that they 
never notified Triad of this alleged business insurance or attempted to cure the fact that the insurance 
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certificate provided by them had been cancelled. Id. 
On April 19, 2006, Triad assigned the account to States Recovery. On April 27, 2006, States 
Recovery repossessed the equipment. The equipment was then later sold at an equipment auction 
later that summer, July of 2006, to the highest bidder. After expenses, Triad received a check from 
US Auction in the amount of$34,!99.20 (Exhibit L). Triad then deducted the amount recovered 
from the sale of the equipment and sent Appellants another demand requesting the deficiency 
balance due and owing which was $58,754.80 (Exhibit F, page 3). Appellants do not dispute that 
they have failed to pay any amount to Triad for the deficiency due and owing under the terms of the 
lease agreement and they have provided no evidence that the amount due and owing as a result of 
their default is anything other than $58,754.80. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The issues on appeal can be summarized as follows: 
1. Whether the district court's decision following a court trial is supported by 
substantial evidence? 
2. Whether Respondent is entitled to its attorney fees and costs incurred as a result of 
this appeal? 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When reviewing the district court's decision following a court trial, the appellate court's: 
decision is limited to ascertaining whether the evidence supports the findings of fact, 
and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions oflaw. A district court's 
findings of fact in a bench trial will be liberally construed on anpeal in favor of the 
judgment entered, in view of the district court's role as trier of fact. It is the province 
of the district judge acting as trier of fact to weigh conflicting evidence and testimony 
and to judge the credibility of the witnesses. [The appellate court] will not substitute 
[its J view of the facts for the view of the district court. Instead, where findings of 
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fact are based on substantial evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting, those 
findings will not be overturned on appeal. 
Nampa &Meridian Irrigation District v. Washington Federal Savings, 135 Idaho 518, 521, 20 P .3d 
702, 705 (2001) ( citations omitted) ( emphasis added). With respect to the "trial court's conclusions 
oflaw, however, a different standard applies: this Court is not bound by the legal conclusions of the 
trial court, but may draw its own conclusions." Griffith v. Clear Lakes Trout Co., Inc., 143 Idaho 
733, 152 P.3d 604 (2007) (quotingindep. Lead Mines Co. v. Hecla Mining Co., 143 Idaho 22, 26, 
137 P.3d 409,413 (2006)). 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court's Decision Was Supported by Substantial and Competent Evidence. 
1. The District Court Did Not Err in Holding that Appellant was in Breach of the 
Lease Agreement. 
Appellants argue that the district court incorrectly found that the Appellants had breached 
the terms of the lease agreement. However, Appellants have not provided any citations to the 
record/transcript which would demonstrate that the district court's findings were erroneous. The 
appellate court will not search the record for error. Langley v. State Indus. Indem. Fund, 126 Idaho 
781, 890 P.2d 735 (1995). Moreover, assertions of error which are not supported by argument or 
authorities carmot be considered on appeal. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259,923 P.2d 966 (1996). 
Here, Appellants have done nothing more than attempt to re-argue their version of the facts and have 
not pointed to any findings by the district court which are not supported by substantial and competent 
evidence. If the district court's findings are supported by substantial evidence they will not be 
overturned on appeal even if Appellants have conflicting versions of the evidence. 
While not entirely clear, Appellants suggest the district court erred in finding Appellants in 
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breach of the lease agreement "for not paying the security deposit." Appellants' Brief, pg. 24. 
However, the district court addressed this argument and found that lease agreement called for a 
$5,000.00 security deposit and that Appellants' delivered the deposit check at the time the agreement 
was signed. The district court stated that "Rocky Mountain claims that this check was not to be 
cashed, but was held as security as had been done in an earlier transaction with Lund. There is no 
evidence that Triad agreed to such an arrangement. $600.00 of the check was for payment of taxes 
and document fees, so it is unlikely that Triad would have agreed not to cash this check." (R. pg. 
90). Thus, the district court considered Appellants' argument but dismissed it because there was no 
evidence to support the claim. On appeal, Appellants have not provided any basis for suggesting 
that the district court's finding was in error. 
Appellants then argue that the there could be no breach because there had been no delivery 
of the equipment. Once again, these assertions were addressed by the district court in its findings 
of fact and Appellants have not demonstrated that the district court's findings are not supported by 
substantial and competent evidence. The district court first, as the trier of fact, weighed the evidence 
as to whether the equipment had been delivered. The district court noted that even though the 
Appellants deny that a conversation verifying delivery of the equipment ever took place, Mr. 
Blittersdorf's deposition testimony was that he did not recall a conversation. (Tr. pg. 319-321, Ins. 
2-15). The district court then found that Ms. "Turner's testimony was the most credible because of 
her recollection of detail and because she released $56,465.68 to Lund at the time." (R. pg. 91) (Tr. 
pg. 203-204, Ins. 6-21 ). 
In addition to concluding that the evidence supported the finding that the equipment had been 
delivered, the district court also noted that paragraph 8 of the lease agreement provided that Triad 
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is not responsible for the delivery of the equipment. Thus, the district court found that Triad was 
not responsible for the delivery of the equipment, and Ms. Turner's testimony that she verified that 
the equipment had been delivered prior to releasing any funds to the vendor was the most credible 
evidence. These findings cannot be reversed on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous, and 
Appellants have done nothing more than assert that the district court should not have relied on the 
testimony of Ms. Turner. 
Appellants also contend that the district court erred in finding that any payment had become 
due. It is not exactly clear from Appellants' Brief, but apparently Appellants again assert that no 
payment was due because there was no $5,000.00 security deposit due. Appellants have suggested 
that the security deposit was to be a bucket and the check they returned with the lease agreement in 
the amount of $5,600.00 was not to be negotiated. However, both Mr. and Mrs. Blittersdorf 
confirmed that there was no mention in the lease agreement that the bucket was owned by them or 
was to be the security deposit. (Tr. pg. 311-312, Ins. 22-1; pg. 355, Ins. 3-11). Also, the check was 
not post dated and there was no mention on the check that it was not to be negotiated. (Tr. 312-315, 
Ins. 24-18). As previously noted, supra, the district court considered Appellants' argument but 
found that the evidence, including the terms of the lease agreement itself, supported the finding that 
there was no arrangement that the check would be held (R. pg. 90). Accordingly, the district court 
found that when the check in the amountof$5,600.00 was returned for insufficient funds, twice, and 
the problem was never cured or remedied, Appellants were in breach of the lease agreement (R. pg. 
91). Once again, other than suggesting that the district court did not agree with their version of the 
evidence, Appellants have not pointed to any evidence to demonstrate that the district court's 
findings were not supported by substantial evidence. 
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2. The District Court's Determination of the Parties Intent was Not Erroneous. 
Appellants argue that the district court erred because "[a]s a basis for several rulings, the 
District Court determined the contract between Triad and Rocky Mountain to be clear and 
unambiguous." Appellants ' Brief, pg. 13. It is not entirely clear what rulings Appellants are 
referencing, but Appellants then asserts that there are numerous ambiguities in the terms of the lease 
agreement and argue that"[ t]hese ambiguities and interpretations clearly require additional, outside 
information to determine this meaning." Appellants' Brief, pg. 15. First of all, the terms of the lease 
agreement which Appellants complain about are clear and unambiguous. Indeed, the terms of the 
lease agreement are clear that the vendor, Lund Machinery, was not the agent of Triad. The terms 
are also clear that the bucket was part of the leased equipment and there is no mention that the bucket 
was already owned and was supposed to be considered a deposit. Along those same lines, the lease 
agreement is clear that a deposit of$5,000.00 was due, that the bucket was not the deposit, and that 
the deposit was not to be in the form of a check to be held and not negotiated. 
Furthermore, Appellants' argument is flawed because a court trial was held, testimony was 
presented by the Appellants as to the lease agreement, and extrinsic evidence was considered to 
resolve any ambiguous terms of the lease agreement. In fact, in support of their argument Appellants 
cite to International Engineering Co., Inc. v. Daum Industries, Inc., 102 Idaho 363,630 P.2d 155 
(1981) and Roeder Mining, Inc. v. Robert E. Johnson et al., 118 Idaho 96, 794 P.2d 1152 (Ct.App. 
1990) for the proposition that if a contract is deemed ambiguous then the trier of fact may look to 
extrinsic evidence to determine the parties' intent. Appellants' Brief, pg. 13. The cases cited by 
Appellants also provide that"[ w ]here interpretation of the parties agreement becomes a question of 
fact, this Court will not set aside the trial court's finding unless it is clearly erroneous." Id. ( quoting 
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International Engineering Co.,Inc. v. Daum Industries, Inc., 102 Idaho 363,365,630 P.2d 155, 157 
(1981)). Thus, even if a particular term of the lease agreement could be deemed ambiguous, it 
becomes a question of fact that the district court, as the trier of fact, determines the intent of the 
parties. 
In this case, there was a court trial held with respect to the claims of Triad. The district court 
as the trier of fact considered and weighed the evidence and found in favor of Triad. The district 
court considered the testimony of the Appellants, including their arguments that the deposit was to 
be a bucket rather than the $5,000.00 called for in the lease agreement, and rejected the arguments. 
In other words, the ambiguity that Appellants now complain of was addressed by the district court 
during the court trial and the district court considered extrinsic evidence. Because the district court 
did consider extrinsic evidence and testimony during the court trial the issue is not whether the tenns 
of the lease agreement were ambiguous, but rather whether the district court's findings were clearly 
erroneous. 
Appellants once again assert that the district court erred by finding that a $5,000.00 security 
deposit was due. The district court, after the court trial and after hearing the testimony and evidence 
of Appellants, found that the lease "agreement unequivocally called for a $5,000.00 security 
deposit." (R. pg. 90). As previously addressed, supra, the district court's findings that the security 
deposit was not be a bucket, and that the deposit check was not to be simply held, were supported 
by substantial and competent evidence. Other than asserting that the district court's interpretation 
of the evidence was wrong, Appellants have not demonstrated that the findings were in error. 
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B. The District Court Did Not Err iu Findiug that Lund Machinery was Not the Agent of 
Triad. 
Appellants contend that the district court erred in finding that Lund Machinery was not the 
agent of Triad. Appellants arguments appear to be related to the district court's summary judgment 
decision in favor of Lund Machinery and the district court's decision denying Appellants' motion 
for reconsideration of the summary judgment decision. For that reason, Triad will leave it to Lund 
Machinery to respond to the majority of these arguments. 
However, to the extent Appellants are challenging any decision as it relates to Triad, Triad 
will address the findings following the court trial that Lund Machinery and its employees were not 
the agents of Triad. The district court's findings referenced its prior decision which held that the 
facts demonstrated that Lund Machinery was not the agent of Triad and paragraph 4(b) of the lease 
agreement itself provided that neither the vendors, nor anyone else, would be considered the agents 
of Triad. (R. pg. 91-92). 
In Hausam v. Schnabl, 126 Idaho 569,887 P.2d 1076 (Ct.App. 1994), the court explained 
the standard of review for an agency relationship as follows: 
The existence of an agency relationship is a question for the trier of fact to resolve 
from the evidence. This Court will not disturb a district court's finding of fact 
unless it is clearly erroneous. The burden of proving the existence or extent of an 
agency rests on the party alleging it. 
Id. at 572,887 P.2d at 1079 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
In this case, there is no evidence of an express or implied agency. To the contrary, the lease 
agreement specifically denies any agency relationship between Triad, its vendors or anyone else. 
To establish apparent authority, "the apparent power of the agent is to be determined by the 
acts of the principal, not the acts of the agent." Id. at 573, 887 P.2d at 1080. The purported 
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principal must do something to lead the third party to believe that the alleged agent has authority, 
and "the declaration of the alleged agent, standing alone, are insufficient to prove the grant of power 
exercised by the agent and to bind the principal to third parties." Id. Moreover, one must use 
reasonable diligence to ascertain the agent's authority which "encompasses a duty to inquire with 
the principal about the agent's authority." Id. 
The district court properly found that there was no evidence of any actions by Triad which 
would create an agency with Lund Machinery and there is no evidence that Appellants exercised 
reasonable diligence by inquiring to Triad about the alleged agent's authority. In fact, Mr. 
Blittersdorftestified that prior to March 15, 2006, the day he signed the lease agreements, he had 
never heard of Triad and he had not had any conversations with Triad. (Tr. pg. 326, Ins. 15-18; pg. 
327, Ins. 18-21). Once again, Appellants arguments are unsupported by the evidence, Appellants 
have not met there burden and there has been no showing that the district court's findings were 
clearly erroneous. 
The district court also rejected Appellants' argument that the lease broker, Joe Leslie, was 
the agent of Triad and found that: 
Rocky Mountain asserted at trial that Leslie, the broker, also made misrepresentations 
as an agent of Triad. There was no evidence that Leslie was an agent of Triad, and 
no evidence that Triad engaged in any deceptive acts or practices with regard to the 
lease; in fact, there was no contact between Rocky Mountain and Triad prior to 
Rocky Mountain's closing on the lease. 
(R. pg. 92). 
In fact, Mr. Blittersdorftestified that he understood that Mr. Leslie was associated with FCI 
Financial. (Tr. pg. 327, Ins. 18-21). Thus, the district court made the findings that there was no 
evidence Lund Machinery or Joe Leslie were the agents of Triad, there was no evidence that Triad 
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engaged in deceptive acts or practices and in fact there was no evidence that Triad even had contact 
with Appellants prior to the closing of the lease. Appellants have not presented any references to 
the record or transcript which would demonstrate that these findings are not supported by substantial 
and competent evidence. 
C. Respondent is Entitled to Attorney Fees on Appeal. 
Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41, Respondent requests its costs and attorney fees 
be awarded to it on appeal. In this case, judgment was entered against the Appellants due to their 
breach ofa Lease Agreement. Paragraph l 7(b) of the Lease Agreement provides that upon default 
Triad may recover reasonable costs and reasonable attorney fees. Thus, the parties have a specific 
agreement/contract which allows the recovery of attorney fees and costs by Triad. 
Moreover, the causes of action in this matter, specifically the breach of the lease agreement, 
involved a commercial transaction as defined by LC. § 12-120(3). Idaho Code § 12-120(3) 
specifically references "guaranty." Thus, in addition to the lease agreement specifically providing 
for the recovery of attorney fees and costs, this is a civil action in which attorney fees are also 
recoverable under LC. § 12-120(3). 
Based upon these above-mentioned facts and law, the district court awarded attorney fees to 
the Triad based upon the terms of the Lease Agreement, LC.§ 12-120(3) and LR.C.P. 54. (R. pgs. 
100-102). The district court's award of attorney fees to Triad is not an issue in this appeal, however, 
the basis for awarding fees before the district court also applies on appeal. Erickson v. Flynn, 138 
Idaho 430, 64 P .3d 959 (Ct.App. 2002). Accordingly, Respondent/Triad is entitled to an award of 
attorney fees and costs on appeal for the same reasons as relied upon by the district court. 
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. V. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Triad respectfully request that the district court's decisions and 
judgments be affirmed. Appellants have done nothing more than ask this Court to second guess the 
findings of the district court without providing any citations or authority to challenge the district 
court's decision. Appellants have not provided any basis that the district court's decision was not 
supported by substantial evidence. Lastly, this Court should award Triad its costs and attorney fees 
on appeal pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41. 
'f ./;J,-DA TED this_ day of April, 2009. 
RINGERT LAW J,;,HARTERED 
~~ By_~~------------
S. Bryce Farris 
Attorneys for Respondent/Triad Leasing and Financial, Inc. 
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